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There are several reasons why a definition for mental disorder is essential. Among these 
are not only reasons linked to psychiatry itself as a science (nosology, research) but also 
to ethical, legal, and financial issues. The first formal definition of mental disorder resulted 
from a deep conceptual analysis led by Robert Spitzer. It emerged to address several 
challenges that psychiatry faced at the time, namely to serve as the starting point for an 
atheoretical and evidence-based classification of mental disorders, to justify the removal 
of homosexuality from classifications, and to counter the arguments of antipsychiatry. 
This definition has been updated, with some conceptual changes that make it depart 
from the main assumptions of Spitzer’s original definition. In this article, we intend to 
review the factors that substantiated the emergence of the first formal definition of mental 
disorder that based all its later versions.
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iNtrODUctiON
The existence of a formal definition of mental disorder remains essential for several reasons that 
include the following: 1) to know which diagnosis should or not be included in the classifications 
(1–3); 2) to separate areas of responsibility of the medical system from other societal systems; 3) 
to avoid dangerous medicalization of social problems; 4) to distinguish between pathological and 
normal; 5) to identify the conditions that, as a result of their negative consequences, implicitly have 
a call to action to the psychiatrists; 6) to identify the cases that justify societal recognition of the 
appropriateness of the sick role; 7) to understand which situations may prevent legal imputability; 8) 
to avoid false positives and other related problems such as overmedicalization, unnecessary labeling, 
wasted resources; and 9) to define psychiatry’s position as a special medical discipline (1–7).
The first formal definition of mental disorder was presented in DSM-III stemming from a deep 
conceptual review carried out by APA’s Committee on Nomenclature, headed by Spitzer. This defini-
tion was designed to address various needs psychiatry had at the time, notably to serve as a starting 
point for an atheoretical and evidence-based classification of mental disorders, to justify the removal 
of homosexuality from classifications, and to counter the arguments of antipsychiatry (according to 
which psychiatry was more oriented to social and ethical values rather than medical ones and could 
constitute a form of social control) (6, 7).
In recent times, this definition has been updated, with conceptual changes insufficiently discussed 
within psychiatry, and a consequent gradual detachment from Spitzer’s original definition. It is 
essential to reflect on the context in which this first formal definition of mental disorder emerges, 
and all the considerations that resulted therein, before making any updates to this definition.
This article intends to briefly review the factors that laid the foundations for the establishment 
of the first formal definition of mental disorder and which formed the basis for all its later versions.
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the Need for a Definition of Mental 
Disorder As a starting Point for an 
Atheoretical and evidence-Based 
classification
Prior to the DSM-III, diagnostic classification was “based upon 
the best clinical judgment and experience of a committee and its 
consultants” [Ref. (5), p. 57]. The 1970s marked the beginning of 
a movement aimed at improving the quality of classification in 
psychiatry with various initiatives, including the development 
of the “Diagnostic Criteria for Use in Psychiatric Research”—
DCPR (5) and the “Research Diagnostic Criteria” (RDC) (8). 
These initiatives represent the basis for the development of 
DSM-III nosological classification and criteria (6). The goal 
was to create systems with better validity for classifying mental 
disorders that did not depend, as in the past, on theoretical 
perspectives (psychodynamic, biological, etc). Spitzer believed 
that the starting point for any psychiatric classification should 
begin with the most atheoretical and value independent defini-
tion of mental disorder. Therefore, in the DSM-III “each of the 
mental disorders is conceptualized as a clinically significant 
behavioral or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs 
in an individual and that is typically associated with either a 
painful symptom (distress) or impairment in one or more 
important areas of functioning (disability). In addition, there 
is an inference that there is a behavioral, psychological, or bio-
lo gical dysfunction (…)” [Ref. (9), p. 6].
Consistent with a descriptive and atheoretical structure, the 
DSM-III enhances the importance of the harm criteria (distress 
and disability) comparatively with the criteria of psychiatric/psy-
chological dysfunction (generally linked to a specific theoretical 
point of view) (9).
the issue of Homosexuality and  
the concept of Dysfunction
One of the contributing factors for the need to define mental 
disorder was an attempt not to include situations more related to 
cultural, moral, and religious values than to medical ones (which 
define what is harmful to the patient and should be treated) and 
which long undermined psychiatric classifications. Several such 
situations have been defined as mental disorders throughout his-
tory, such as, “drapetomania” (applied to American slaves who 
wanted to escape) and “sluggish schizophrenia” (applied to politi-
cal dissidents in the Soviet Union). The case of homosexuality 
motivated a deep reflection within the APA on which situations 
to include as mental disorder or not.
According to Spitzer, the category of homosexuality did not 
make sense because one could not “insist on a label of sickness for 
individuals who insist that they are well (i.e., have ‘no subjective 
distress’) and who demonstrate no generalized impairment in 
social effectiveness” [Ref. (10), p. 1216].
In another document he refers “in reviewing the charac-
teristics of the various mental disorders included in DSM-II, 
Spitzer concluded that, except for homosexuality, and perhaps 
other ‘sexual deviations,’ they all regularly caused subjective 
distress or were associated with generalized impairment in 
social effectiveness or functioning. It was proposed that the 
consequences of a condition, and not its etiology determined 
whether the condition should be considered a disorder” [Ref. (11), 
p. 16]. These arguments led Spitzer to privilege the criteria of 
harm (distress and disability) in detriment of criteria such as 
dysfunction, which was the main criterion for the definition of 
medical disease at the time.
The most defended model of disease in the 20th century was 
Boorse’s. According to this model, a disease corresponds to a 
dysfunction—alteration of natural functions resulting in reduced 
life expectancy and/or reproductive expectations (supposedly 
a value-free concept), emphasizing the importance of a 
dysfunction (biological or psychological) for the existence 
of a disease (12, 13, 14). Later, Wakefield agrees with Boorse’s 
dysfunction concept, arguing that these mechanisms may be 
physical or mental (12): “mental processes play important 
species-typical roles in human survival and reproduction, there is 
no reason to doubt that mental processes were naturally selected 
and have natural functions as Darwin himself often emphasized” 
[Ref. (12), p. 375]. But for Wakefield, the presence of dysfunction 
is insufficient to determine the presence of medical disturbance, 
the criteria of harm (distress–disability) must also be present, 
disagreeing with Boorse at this point (for whom biological or 
mental dysfunction suffices) (7). Both Boorse and Wakefield 
considered that the concept of dysfunction is independent of val-
ues and essential for the definition of any medical or psychiatric 
disorder.
Numerous criticisms have since arisen to the possibility of 
classifying certain psychological characteristics such as dys-
functions (7). Wakefield himself assumes this when stating that 
in some cases, such as homosexuality, it is difficult to assume 
the criterion of dysfunction (such as psychological alteration 
that interferes with the reproductive function), “in the contem-
porary context of overpopulation and widespread birth control 
among heterosexuals, the highest generally accepted normative 
goal of sexual-love relationships in our society is not reproduc-
tion per  se but mutual interpersonal and sexual satisfaction” 
[Ref. (15), p. 676].
Thus, the most appropriate criteria for the definition of mental 
disorder and depending upon more universal values (than those 
associated with the definition of psychological dysfunction) 
would be those of distress and disability (7). As Gert and Culver 
stated “every society regards death, pain, disability and loss of 
pleasure as harms” [Ref. (16), p. 421].
Perhaps that is why Spitzer masterfully highlighted the pres-
ence of distress and disability criteria as priority in the definition 
of mental disorder in order to avoid and exclude dubious situa-
tions such as homosexuality, and other entities historically con-
sidered as mental disorders, alleging a psychological dysfunction 
assessed according to values (social, moral, and cultural) often 
masked as science. So Spitzer says about his definition of mental 
disorder that “these criteria avoid such terms as ‘dysfunction’… 
which themselves beg definition” [Ref. (1), p17]. Though he ends 
up using it (perhaps to not completely dissociate himself from 
the definition of medical disease valid at the time) referring “in 
addition, there is an inference that there is a behavioral, psycho-
logical, or biological dysfunction” [Ref. (9), p. 6], the universal 
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criteria of distress and disability undoubtedly take supremacy in 
this definition.
Antipsychiatry
Although antipsychiatry in the general sense of the term is as 
old as psychiatry (17), emerging in the 19th century, the move-
ment known as “antipsychiatry” rose in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Associated with this movement were the names of Foucault, 
Szasz, Basaglia, Cooper, Laing, and others. Although there are 
several “antipsychiatries,” the common denominator is the fight 
against the psychiatric institution synthesized in the figure of the 
doctor and his power (18, 19). Criticism of repressive psychiatric 
power is the essential point of the movement, being the criticism 
of the concept of mental disorder and pharmacological therapies 
derivatives of this fundamental position.
In the book Madness and Civilization, Foucault presents the 
historical genesis of the concept of mental disorder, as we under-
stand it today, which he does not separate from the psychiatric 
institution. That is to say, no knowledge about mental disorder 
is separated from its place of formation, the asylum. Asylum, in 
turn, follows a series of historical experiences that are predomi-
nantly of social control. Thus, finally, claiming that the science of 
psychiatry is essentially a knowledge seeking to justify the moral 
power of the physician. According to this view, psychiatrists forget 
this origin of their power and attribute it to objective knowledge 
obtained scientifically (20).
Szasz also considered the concept of mental disorder to be a 
myth (21). There is psychological suffering and life problems, but 
it will be a categorical mistake to consider them as “diseases” (22). 
Body and mind would belong to two orders of being qualitatively 
different. The body of medicine is explained by a mechanistic 
causality, and physiological diseases are lesions of organs, per-
fectly identified. The mind could not be explained by mechanical 
causes because it is intentionality and rationality. Thus, according 
to Szasz, one should not speak of mental “disorders” but of devia-
tions from socially accepted norms and values. It would not be 
a question of the violation of the natural order, but of the social 
order (21).
Considering all these arguments, psychiatry had no alterna-
tive but to strengthen its status with a valid definition of mental 
disorder that would deviate from social, moral, and religious 
values. It should therefore be a priority to delimit the activity of 
psychiatry as a medical specialty, according to the main objec-
tive of medicine: the relief of the patient’s symptoms linked to 
distress and disability. Thus, distress and disability became the 
main criteria of this new definition of mental disorder. Spitzer 
himself preferred the name of disorder rather than disease 
highlighting that “there is no assumption that the organismic 
dysfunction or its negative consequences are of a physical 
nature,” because disease “often denotes a progressive physical 
disorder with known pathophysiology” [Ref. (1), p. 17], accept-
ing a general basic difference between mental disorders and 
medical disease.
Conversely, giving a primordial role to the criteria of harm 
could also divert the focus of mental disorder, from the doctor 
(his values and power) to the patient and his needs arising from 
the suffering he bears.
DiscUssiON
The first formal definition of mental disorder appears in DSM-III 
as a result of a deep conceptual review. This definition emerged 
to meet various needs of psychiatry at that time, in particular to 
serve as a starting point for an evidence-based and atheoretical 
classification of mental disorder and to justify the removal of 
homosexuality from classifications and counter the arguments 
of antipsychiatry. A definition was elaborated in which the main 
condition for a mental disorder to be present was the presence of 
the criteria of distress and disability (less permeable to theoretical 
differences and to moral, cultural, and religious values than the 
concept of psychiatric or psychological dysfunction).
The criteria of harm (distress and disability) remained as 
paramount in the definition of mental disorder in DSM-IV and 
the importance of these criteria also led them to make part of the 
specific diagnostic criteria for most disorders listed in DSM-IV.
Nevertheless, in DSM-5 a major and barely discussed change 
occurred, the concept of dysfunction takes precedence, appearing 
at the beginning of the definition, possibly being considered its 
main criterion:
A mental disorder is a syndrome characterized by 
clinically significant disturbance in an individual’s 
cognition, emotion regulation, or behavior that reflects 
a dysfunction in the psychological, biological, or devel-
opmental processes underlying mental functioning. 
Mental disorders are usually associated with significant 
distress or disability in social, occupational, or other 
important activities… [Ref. (23), p. 20].
Harm criteria are no longer a basic requirement, but a frequent 
occurrence that might or not be present.
This could lead to the inclusion (in psychiatric diagnostic 
manuals) of situations that are not associated with distress and 
disability as happened in the past, potentially re-exposing psy-
chiatry to the danger that entities considered psychological or 
biological dysfunctions, according to certain theoretical currents 
(easily permeable to moral and social values), may be considered 
mental disorders.
The problem of considering a mental disorder to be mainly a 
dysfunction (as in DSM-5) may arise in both perspectives: as a 
biological dysfunction or as a psychological dysfunction.
Several problems arise regarding the possibility of consider-
ing mental disorders as synonymous of biological dysfunction. 
Psychiatric disorders are not natural kinds directly visualized 
and discriminated by neuroimaging tests. Psychiatric disorders 
are “social constructs” that do not exist independently of human 
effort (6, 24, 25). The evaluation of what is pathological or not in 
psychiatry is related to 1) comprehensibility (whether or not the 
mental state/behavior is comprehensible given the sociocultural 
context of the patient), 2) adaptability (adaptive or non-adaptive 
in the context of the patient), and 3) connection to distress and 
disability (whether or not they cause distress or disability) (26). 
The latter being the most universal criteria (7, 24). The above-
mentioned criteria define the presence or absence of mental 
symptoms or disorder that is primary or secondary to a physical 
4
Telles-Correia et al. Mental Disorder—The Need for an Accurate Definition
Frontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org March 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 64
dysfunction. As an example, in the case of a brain tumor that 
subsequently induces depressive symptoms, clinical depression 
is assessed through clinical criteria (comprehensibility, adapt-
ability, and harm inducing). Mental manifestations, regardless 
of the physical or neurological core, only represent a mental 
disorder if they are regarded as inadequate, non-adaptative, or 
causing harm (considering the sociocultural background and 
circumstances of the patient). That cannot mean that we cannot 
try to find the physical or neurological correlates of these mental 
manifestations. However, in psychiatry, separation of disordered 
from non- disordered is not dependent upon neurological 
biomarkers. This means that clinical concepts are precursors to 
biological concepts. Thus, mental disorder cannot only be defined 
by a physical or biological dysfunction (27).
Conversely, it is also controversial to define mental disorder 
through a psychological dysfunction. As mentioned by Fullford, 
dysfunction as the concept of failure of a mechanism to determine 
a natural function is a concept inextricably linked to values. For 
biological issues and medical values (what is considered useful or 
not to the organism by specific societies) change over time (28, 29). 
Additionally, there is much less consensus about the concept of 
psychological dysfunction than that of biological dysfunction, due to 
an insufficient knowledge about the psychological processes. Thus, 
recognizing the dysfunctional aspects of psychological mechanisms 
is harder (30). Notwithstanding, mental functions are directly bound 
to a social role that physical functions are not, meaning that the 
former are much more linked to social and cultural values (30).
Moreover, the definition of dysfunction of psychological 
mechanisms, as a failure of internal mechanisms to perform their 
functions as designed by nature, traces an artificial boundary 
between what is natural (innate), as opposed to social (cultivated) 
(22). Additionally, “human behavior is also socially designed and 
the relative contributions of biology and social rules are complex 
and interwoven, not easy to tease apart” [Ref. (25), p. 124].
Kirmayer adds that: “there is little consensus on what our psy-
chological systems are for and many evolutionary psychologists 
argue that we have evolved to be able to adapt to situations rather 
than to have fixed or specific functions. Any change in culture 
will change the fitness of specific psychological, traits, give new 
meaning and purpose to biological functions, and change their 
boundaries and interdependence. Beyond relatively simple physi-
ological functions it is impossible to identify what psychological 
systems or functions are for in any universal sense” [Ref. (31), 
pp. 18–19].
Furthermore, psychiatric disorders could be caused by dis-
tinct situations, instead of disruption function (e.g., defensive/ 
coping strategies, design/environment mismatches, maladaptive- 
looking phenotypes that may be adaptive; highly evolved learn-
ing capacities leading to maladaptive behavior) (25).
cONcLUsiON
The difficulties inherent to the use of the concept of dysfunc-
tion to define a psychiatric disorder are not only a problem of 
validity in psychiatry but may also make psychiatry permeable 
(again) to the typical criticisms of antipsychiatry which claimed 
that psychiatric disorders were more linked to values associated 
with culture-specific social and political ideologies rather than 
medical values (which identify harmful situations to the patient 
and in need of treatment). Spitzer attempted to circumvent these 
issues by making distress and disability (revealed at the patients’ 
level) the main defining criteria of mental disorders. These are 
concepts that are closer to the patient than to the psychiatrist and 
that are loaded with more universal values (it is consensual that 
distress and disability are negative for the patient and deserve to 
be relieved). On the other hand, as mentioned, the determination 
of biological or even psychological dysfunction in most psychi-
atric disorders is difficult, controversial, and usually the result of 
influenceable theoretical currents.
In essence, the first definition of mental disorder resulted from 
a rigorous conceptual analysis. We should continue to promote 
critical reviews and conceptual analysis on this topic which can 
debate the problems that it entails and the dangers that an appar-
ently harmless change to the definition of mental disorders (such 
as that which was taken in DSM 5) can bring toward psychiatry.
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